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Article 1

ARTICLES

PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING REVISITED
AND REVISED:
A COMMENT ON ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
Robert G. Bone*
This Article critically examines the Supreme Court's most recent decision
on Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, decided in May
2009. The Article supplements and extends the analysis in my recent article,
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, which
examined the Supreme Court's seminalBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly decision and evaluated the costs and benefits of screening meritless suits at the
pleading stage. In this Article, I argue that Iqbal does much more than clarify
and reinforce key points in Twombly; it takes Twombly 's plausibility standard in a new and ultimately ill-advised direction. My criticism has two parts.
First, Iqbal adopts a "two-pronged approach" that filters legal conclusions in
the first prong before applying the plausibility standard to factual allegations
in the second. I argue that this two-pronged approach is incoherent. There is
only one prong: the judge must determine whether the complaint, interpreted as
a coherent whole, plausibly supports each element of the legal claim. The second problem with Iqbal runs deeper. Iqbal screens lawsuits more aggressively
than Twombly, and does so without adequate consideration of the policy
stakes. In particular,Iqbal applies a thick screeningmodel that aims to screen
weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a thin screening
@ 2010 Robert G. Bone. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* G. Rollie White Professor, The University of Texas School of Law. I would like
to thank my BU colleague Ward Farnsworth and my UT colleague Patrick Woolley for
their helpful comments, as well as Christy Renworth and Bob Little for their excellent
research assistance. I presented much of this Article to the January 7, 2010 meeting
of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and I would like to
thank the members of the Committee for a useful discussion of the ideas.
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model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits. The thick screening model
is highly problematic on policy grounds, even in cases like Iqbal that involve
qualified immunity. Moreover the Supreme Court is not institutionally well
equipped to decide whether strict pleading is desirable, especially when it implements a thick screening model. Those decisions should be made through the
formal Rules Enabling Act process or by Congress.
INTRODUCTION

Court access has become a matter of intense concern today in the
wake of two major pleading decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. The first, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,' held that a plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts to state a "plausible" claim for relief.2
Twombly's critics-and there are many-complain that the plausibility
standard unfairly impedes court access for meritorious suits. The second decision, Ashcroft v. Iqbal,4 issued on May 18, 2009, applies the
plausibility standard to allegations that are less obviously deficient
than those in Twombly and, in so doing, signals an even stricter
approach to pleading requirements. Provoked by the Iqbal decision,
many critics now believe that it is imperative to undo the effects of
plausibility pleading. On July 22, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Notice Pleading Restoration Act 5 aimed at reinstating the
liberal notice pleading standards existing prior to Twombly, and on
November 19, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced the
Open Access to. Courts Act 6 for the same purpose.
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2 See id. at 556, 570.
3 See, e.g., Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1217, 1260-64 (2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading,49 B.C. L. REv. 431,
433, 479-83 (2008).
4 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
5 S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). The Notice Pleading Restoration Act provides in
full:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after
the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b) (6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Id. § 2.
6 H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). The Open Access to Courts Act provides in
relevant part:
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b) (6), (c), or (e) of
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond
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I discussed Twombly, plausibility pleading, and court access in a
previous article. 7 This Article extends that earlier work by examining
what Iqbal adds to Twombly. Although the Court purports to be applying Twombly's plausibility standard, a fair reading of the majority opinion shows that Iqbal's version of plausibility is significantly stricter
than Twombly's. Moreover, the Iqbal Court enlists plausibility for a
broader purpose. Twombly uses plausibility to screen only for truly
meritless suits, but Iqbal uses it to screen for weak lawsuits too. The
difference is crucial. Screening weak lawsuits raises much more complex and controversial policy questions than screening meritless suits,
and the Supreme Court is not well equipped institutionally to address
those policy questions. They are better left to the committees
involved in the formal rulemaking process or to Congress.
Moreover, although a response to Iqbal is needed, neither of the
proposed bills is the right response. It is not at all clear that the best
approach is to restore pre- Twombly law. There is much to commend
Twombly's thin plausibility standard and those benefits should be considered seriously in designing an optimal pleading approach. 8 A clear
understanding of the differences between Iqbal and Twombly makes it
possible to consider Twombly's virtues without the taint of Iqbats vices.
The body of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Part II focuses on what Iqbal adds
doctrinally to Twombly. Iqbals most important doctrinal contribution
is to frame the analysis formally as a "two-pronged approach."9 The
judge must first exclude "legal conclusions" before applying the plausibility standard to the "factual allegations" that remain.1 0 Although
Twombly also excluded legal conclusions, it did so in a very different
way than Iqbal.
Part III sets the stage for the critical discussion in Part IV by
briefly recounting the history of the law-fact distinction in pleading.
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the
judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiffs
claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Id. § 2(a).
7 Robert G. Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009).
8 Moreover, even a somewhat stricter standard might be justified on cost-benefit
grounds for some types of cases, at least as long it is combined with access to limited
before dismissal discovery. See discussion infra Parts IV.C-D.
9 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
10 Id.
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Part IV then makes two criticisms of Iqbal. First, it argues that the twopronged approach is incoherent. The first prong makes no sense
because there is no clear division between legal conclusions and factual allegations. Classifying allegations as legal conclusions is no different than saying that those allegations are too general to support a
plausible case, and that determination must be made by applying the
plausibility standard to the complaint interpreted as a whole.
The second criticism strikes deeper. Iqbal's two-pronged
approach obscures the fact that its pleading standard is stricter than
Twombly's. By eliminating the key allegations in the complaint as
"legal conclusions" in the first prong, the Court makes the second
prong's plausibility analysis seem like a straightforward and relatively
easy application of Twombly. But it is not. Adding the key allegations
back into the complaint shows just how much more demanding Iqbal
is than Twombly.
In particular, Iqbal applies a thick screening model that aims to
screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a thin
screening model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits. The
thick screening model is highly problematic on policy grounds, even
in cases like Iqbal that involve qualified immunity. Moreover, the
Supreme Court is not institutionally well-equipped to decide whether
strict pleading is desirable on a case-specific basis, especially when the
strict pleading standard implements a thick screening model. Those
decisions should be made through the Enabling Act's formal rulemaking process or, as a second best alternative, by Congress.
I.

A

BRIEF SUMMARY OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL

A.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was a nationwide antitrust class
action brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act against the four
largest telecommunications companies in the United States. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had conspired to divide territory and deter new entry by agreeing not to enter one another's markets and to resist entry by others. 1
The Supreme Court held that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted and reinstated the district
court's 12(b) (6) dismissal.' 2 The seven-Justice majority concluded
that the allegations of parallel conduct-that no defendant ever
attempted to enter another's market and that they all used similar
11
12

See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550-51 (2007).
Id. at 566, 570.
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entry-deterrence strategies-were insufficient because the conduct
alleged was exactly what one would expect from vigorous competition
in the telecommunications market, given its distinctive history and
structure. 13 As for the few allegations that directly stated the existence
of an agreement, the Court treated them as "merely legal conclusions
resting on the prior allegations"14 and therefore insufficient to make
the existence of an agreement plausible.
In my previous article, I argued that Twombly changed pleading
law on both a policy and a doctrinal level. 15 On the policy level, the
Court recognized the importance of using pleading to screen meritless suits. Before Twombly, the standard approach, notice pleading,
envisioned the sole function of a complaint as giving fair notice to the
defendant of what the dispute was generally about.' 6 The Twombly
complaint clearly satisfied this standard; the defendants knew what
the plaintiffs were complaining about and could easily admit or deny
the allegations. The Court held, however, that pleading standards
should do more than give notice; they should also screen for meritless
suits. 17
On the doctrinal level, the Court rejected the most generous version of notice pleading, the so-called "possibility" standard, that tolerates allegations if they are merely consistent with the possibility of
wrongdoing. The Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a) (2)'s "short and plain statement" standard requires plausibility,
not just possibility) 8 The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a plausible inference of the existence of each element of the
legal claim. And the plaintiffs in Twombly failed to do this for the
conspiracy element of their Sherman Act claim.1 9
B.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

Ashcroft v. Iqbal was a suit for damages brought by two Arab Muslim men against federal officials based on violations of the U.S. Consti13 In addition to the parallel conduct, the plaintiffs also relied on a statement by
the CEO of Qwest Communications. Id. at 551. The Court concluded that when read
in context, this statement did not have the meaning the plaintiffs attributed to it. Id.
at 568 n.13.
14

Id. at 564.

15 See Bone, supra note 7, at 882-90.
16 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), abrogatedby Twombly, 550 U.S.
544; 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1216 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009).
17 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
18 Id. at 555-56.
19 Id. at 566.
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tution and federal statutes.2 0 The claims focused on the harsh and
demeaning treatment the plaintiffs received while confined with 182
other detainees as "persons of high interest" in a special maximumsecurity facility after the 9/11 attacks. 2' With respect to the discrimination claims, 2 2 the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were
detained and subjected to abusive treatment because of their race,
religion, and national origin. 2 3
The plaintiffs sued all those involved in some significant way,
including John Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the United
States, and Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI. The claims against
Ashcroft and Mueller were not based on their direct involvement in
the abusive treatment, but rather on their actions as supervisors of
those who were directly involved. Ashcroft and Mueller (as well as
other defendants) brought motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6),
relying on qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint failed
to allege enough to support supervisory liability.2 4
20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942-43 (2009). Javaid Iqbal, the only plaintiff remaining on appeal, was a Pakistani Muslim. Iqbal had been arrested on criminal charges before being specially detained. He eventually pled guilty, served his
sentence, and was returned to Pakistan. He filed suit after he was back in Pakistan.
Id. at 1943. The lawsuit is a Bivens action based on implied constitutional claims. See
generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390-97 (1971) (recognizing implied constitutional claims).
21 See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1-3, *6--8
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). These detentions resulted from the massive FBI andJustice
Department investigation in the wake of 9/11. The FBI detained hundreds of individuals on immigration charges and then selected 184 as "persons of high interest" to be
held in maximum security separate from the regular prison population. See id. at
*1-2. The allegations of abusive treatment included severe verbal and physical abuse,
unnecessary strip and body-cavity searches, denial of needed medical care, and unjustified interference with religious activities. Id. at *1, *6-8.
22 Insofar as constitutional claims are concerned, the plaintiffs also alleged violations of their First Amendment right to freedom of religion (based on interference
with their religious activities as Muslims), their Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches (based on the strip and body-cavity searches), their Fifth
Amendment right to due process (based on the failure to provide hearings to determine whether continuing confinement was warranted), their Sixth Amendment right
to counsel (based on the denial of access to lawyers), and their Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at *7-9.
23 Id. at *3, *8.
24 The qualified immunity doctrine insulates government officials from damages
liability for constitutional violations unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right which they reasonably should have known. Also, supervisors cannot be
held liable in Bivens suits for damages based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
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The district judge decided the motion prior to Twombly and thus
applied pre- Twombly notice pleading law. The judge concluded that
the complaint satisfied the pre-Twombly standard.2 5 Recognizing the
special importance of minimizing litigation burdens on government
officials with qualified immunity,2 6 however, the judge ordered staged
and limited discovery and allowed Ashcroft and Mueller to file for
summary judgment if early discovery returns failed to show a sufficient
basis for supervisory liability.2 7
The defendants appealed the decision with respect to one of the
plaintiffs, Javaid Iqbal, 28 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court as to all claims except the procedural due
process claim.2 9 The Second Circuit applied Twombly, which was
decided while the case was on appeal, and concluded that Iqbal's allegations met the plausibility standard.3 0 In particular, the Court found
that the complaint alleged sufficient personal involvement to plausibly
suggest supervisory liability for Ashcroft and Mueller:
[T]he complaint alleges broadly that Ashcroft and Mueller were
instrumental in adopting the "policies and practices challenged
here." The complaint also alleges that the FBI, "under the direction
of Defendant Mueller," arrested thousands of Arab Muslims and
that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiff[ ] to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion,
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological
interest." . . . [T]he allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned
and agreed to the discrimination that the Plaintiff alleges satisfies
the plausibility standard without an allegation of subsidiary facts
because of the likelihood that these senior officials would have concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation of policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested on federal
charges in the New York City area and designated "of high interest"
in the aftermath of 9/11.31
25 Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *11-12, *28-29.
26 Id. at *10-13.
27 Id. at *21.
28 Following the district judge's decision, the United States settled with the other
plaintiff, Ehab Elmaghraby. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
29 Id. at 177-78. Although the court of appeals did not address the issue directly,
the Supreme Court held that there was jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory
appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945-47.
30 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 170, 178.
31 Id. at 175-76 (second and third alterations in original).
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The court recognized, however, that qualified immunity made it
imperative to screen nonmeritorious suits as early as possible, especially in a case like Iqbal, involving senior government officials "against
whom broad-ranging allegations of knowledge and personal involvement are easily made."3 2 The district judge had fashioned a phased
discovery plan to handle these concerns, and the court of appeals suggested some modifications.3 3
The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision. 34 The
opinion dealt only with Ashcroft and Mueller and focused on the discrimination claims.33 The majority first held that, as a substantive
matter, supervisors like Ashcroft and Mueller asserting qualified
immunity could not be held liable for their subordinates' discriminatory activities on principles of respondeat superior or merely on the
basis of knowledge and acquiescence. 3 6 Supervisory liability required
proof that the supervisor himself acted with a discriminatory purpose,
which in the Iqbal case meant that the plaintiff had to allege enough
to show that Ashcroft and Mueller "adopted and implemented the
detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but

32 Id. at 159 ("Rule 8(a)'s liberal pleading requirement, when applied mechanically without countervailing discovery safeguards, threatens to create a dilemma
between adhering to the Federal Rules and abiding by the principle that qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit as well as from liability.").
33 The court of appeals suggested that the district judge start with interrogatories
and requests to admit before deciding whether to allow depositions, and that he also
focus discovery on the "front-line officials" before deciding whether to involve those
higher up. Id. at 158.
34 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1941. The Court split along "conservative"/"liberal" lines,
with Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissenting. Rather than order the
entry of a judgment of dismissal, however, the Court remanded to the court of
appeals for it to decide whether to remand to the district court to allow the plaintiffs
an opportunity to request leave to amend. Id. at 1954. On July 28, 2009, the court of
appeals decided to remand to the district court. See Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 F.3d 820,
822 (2d Cir. 2009). As of this writing, it appears that the case may have settled. See
Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 585 n.8 (2d Cir. 2009) (Sack, J., concurring in part,
and dissenting in part) ("On September 29, 2009, the remaining parties in Iqbal filed
a document in this Court stipulating that the appeal was to be 'withdrawn from active
consideration before the Court . . . because a settlement has been reached in principle between Javaid Iqbal and defendant United States.'" (quoting Stipulation Withdrawing Appeal from Active Consideration, Iqbal v. Hasty, No. 05-5768-cv (2d Cir.
Sept. 29, 2009)).
35 Shortly after this decision, the Court also granted certiorari and remanded as
to several other defendants. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 2431, 2431 (2009);
Hasty v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 2430, 2430 (2009).
36 Iqba4, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
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for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or
national origin."3 7
The Court then turned to the pleading issue, whether the complaint adequately alleged Ashcroft's and Mueller's discriminatory purpose. The key allegations stated that Ashcroft and Muelle "'each
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
[the plaintiff]"' to harsh conditions of confinement "'as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest"' and that Ashcroft was
the "'principal architect"' of this invidious policy and Mueller was
"'instrumental"' in adopting and executing it.38
The Court evaluated the complaint by applying what it called a
"two-pronged approach."39 It first separated out the "legal conclusions," and then evaluated the remaining "factual allegations" to
determine whether they supported a plausible inference of discriminatory purpose. 40 The first prong of the analysis was decisive. The
Court classified the key allegations described above as legal conclusions not entitled to the presumption of truth. 4 '
With the key allegations out of the way, the second prong of the
analysis proceeded smoothly. Although purposeful discrimination
was a possibility, the majority held, the factual allegations plausibly
showed only that Ashcroft and Mueller "sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could
be cleared of terrorist activity." 4 2 Given who perpetrated the 9/11
attacks, this plan might well have had a disparate impact on Arab Muslims, but a disparate impact, the Court noted, is not enough to support a discriminatory purpose.4 3
37
38

Id. at 1949.
Id. at 1944 (second alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint
at §§ 10-11, 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)
(No. 04 CV 01809)).
39 Id. at 1950.
40 Even if the majority rejects a liability standard based on knowledge plus deliberate indifference, as Justice Souter reads it to do, see id. at 1956-58 (Souter, J., dissenting), the Court's opinion still suggests that "some inference of wrongful intent"
might be drawn from evidence that Ashcroft and Mueller "condoned" their subordinates' discriminatory treatment of detainees. Id. at 1952 (majority opinion).
41 Id. at 1951 ("These bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in
Twombly, amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a
constitutional discrimination claim

. . . ."

(quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
42 Id. at 1952.
43 Id. at 1951 ("It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing
law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to
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Justice Souter wrote a stinging dissent joined by Justices Breyer,
Stevens, and Ginsburg. With regard to the pleading issue, 44 Souter
agreed that the complaint, stripped of its key allegations, would not
meet a plausibility standard, but he strongly disagreed that the key
allegations should be ignored as conclusory. 45 If read in isolation,
they might seem conclusory, Souter argued, but when read in the context of the complaint as a whole, they were quite specific. They
alleged responsibility not for some "undefined" or "amorphous" discriminatory policy, but rather for a "particular, discrete, discriminatory policy" of detaining Arab Muslim men. 4 6
It is highly significant thatJustices Souter and Breyer dissented in
Iqbal. Both were with the majority in Twombly. Moreover, Justice Souter, who wrote the principal dissenting opinion in Iqbal, actually

authored the majority opinion in Twombly. These are strong signs that
Iqbal is not just a straightforward application of Twombly.
II.

A.

IQBAL'S SIGNIFICANCE

Old Ground: Twombly 's Scope and the Efficacy of Case Management
Iqbal answers a question left in some doubt after Twombly:

whether the plausibility standard applies beyond antitrust cases. The
Iqbal Court held that it does. Now it is clear that the standard applies
to all claims governed by Rule 8(a) (2)'s "short and plain statement"
requirement.4 7
the attacks [of September 11] would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor
Muslims.").
44 Justice Souter also takes the majority to task for its substantive holding, that
supervisors can be liable only if they act with discriminatory intent themselves. Souter
accuses the majority of reaching the substantive issue without crediting the defendants' concession that knowledge plus deliberate indifference would suffice and without the benefit of briefing and oral argument. See id. at 1956-58 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). But he also notes that the complaint without the key allegations would
still be deficient under a knowledge and deliberate indifference standard. See id. at
1958.
45 See id. at 1960.
46 Id. at 1960-61. Justice Souter concluded that "[t]aking the complaint as a
whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller 'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. at 1961 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
47 See id. at 1953 (majority opinion). This holding was hardly surprising. See
Bone, supra note 7, at 881 (noting that lower courts have answered questions about
the extent of Twombly's holding "in favor of a more general application").
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Iqbal also reiterates Twombly's reservations about the efficacy of
trial judge case management as a way to control discovery.48 Moreover, it relies on these reservations to justify rejecting discovery controls
as a reason for leniency at the pleading stage. The Court might
intend this principle to apply only to qualified immunity cases, but it
uses language that suggests a broader application. 4 9
B.

New Ground: Legal Conclusions Versus FactualAllegations

Iqbal's novel doctrinal contribution is to subdivide the pleading
analysis formally into two prongs, with the first prong sorting legal
conclusions from factual allegations. The distinction between factual
allegations and legal conclusions was an important feature of nineteenth century code pleading, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated it and, as I explain below, a notice pleading system
has little use for it.50 The Iqbal Court breathes new life into the distinction and in so doing injects a highly problematic element into
pleading analysis.5 1
It is true that the Twombly Court relied on the same distinction to
of agreement in that
justify giving short shrift to general allegations
52
In Twombly, the Court
case, but it did so in a very different way.
interpreted the complaint as a whole and concluded that a "fair reading" showed that the general allegations of agreement were intended
to be conclusions based on parallel conduct alleged elsewhere in the
complaint and thus not meant to add anything factually new.53 In
Iqbal, by contrast, the Court deems the key allegations to be legal conclusions not because the plaintiff intended them so-he clearly did
not-but because they just were so.5 4
The maiority in Iqbal is extremely unclear as to why these allegations were legal conclusions. It refers to the "tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint" except
for legal conclusions, and notes that Rule 8 "demands more than an
48 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (referring to "[o]ur rejection of the careful-casemanagement approach").
49 See id. at 1954 ("Because respondent's complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he
is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.").
50 See infra Part Ill.
51 For just a few examples of lower courts applying the two-pronged approach
after Iqbal, see Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009); Chao v.
Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177-79 (D. Mass. 2009); In re Novagold Res. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 629 F. Supp. 2d 272, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
52 See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
53 See id.
54 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
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unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."5 5 It
then associates legal conclusions with "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements"5 6 and condemns the key allegations as "a 'formulaic recitation
of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."5 7
These statements point to some defect or deficiency intrinsic to
the allegation itself. The reference to "formulaic recitation" and "an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" might
suggest that the defect has to do with how closely the allegation tracks
some standard way of expressing the legal element. For example, an
allegation in Iqbal that "defendants intended to discriminate on
account of race, religion, and national origin," without more, might
be conclusory for this reason.
However, this cannot be the problem with the key allegations
actually at issue in the case. The complaint alleged that the defendants "'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to"'
impose harsh conditions on the plaintiff "'as a matter of policy, solely
on account of [his] religion, race, or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest,"' and that Ashcroft was the "'principal
architect"' of this policy and Mueller oversaw its execution.5 8 These
statements describe mental states, link those mental states to a discriminatory policy described in some detail elsewhere in the complaint, and refer to more particular types of involvement by Ashcroft
and Mueller. Admittedly, the mental states are described with conventional terminology used for that purpose (knew, condoned, and willfully and maliciously), but it is not clear what other language the
plaintiff could have used and still conveyed his meaning clearly. 5 9
The adjectives "unadorned," "threadbare" and "conclusory" suggest a different problem; not that the allegations track formulaic language, but that they state facts at too high a level of generality.6 0 A
55 Id. at 1949.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
58 Id. at 1944 (alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint, supra
note 38, §§ 10-11, 96).
59 The words "know" and "condone," for example, are not just technical legal
terms. They are part of ordinary vocabulary used to describe mental states, and their
legal meaning depends to a large extent on their ordinary meaning. Thus, these
words in the complaint convey factual information. Moreover, it is quite sensible in a
situation like this for a pleader to use the same descriptors that the law employs in
order to be clear about what is being alleged, especially since there are few, if any,
alternatives available that convey the same meaning as clearly.
60 This would include statements that contain too much legal terminology and
not enough factual content. The fatal defect in such an allegation cannot be its use of
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formulaic allegation is likely to be general, but a general allegation
need not be formulaic. Justice Souter reads the majority to be saying
this and counters by arguing that the key allegations are actually quite
specific when read in the context of the Iqbal complaint as a whole.'
Justice Souter's argument highlights a serious difficulty with the
degree-of-generality approach to distinguishing conclusions from
facts. There is no obvious way to draw a line along the generalityspecificity continuum, and the Iqbal majority offers nothing to guide
the analysis in a sensible way. To illustrate, consider the now-famous
negligence allegation in Form 11 appended to the Federal Rules: "On
date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
the plaintiff."6 2 Since the Forms are supposed to be sufficient, the
Iqbal majority cannot classify this allegation as a legal conclusion.63
Yet it is difficult to see the difference between this negligence allegation and the key allegations in Iqbal. The Form 11 allegation says
nothing about what the defendant's car was doing before it hit the
plaintiff or why the plaintiff believes the defendant drove negligently.
If anything, the key Iqbal allegations seem more specific. 6 4
Lack of clarity about how to apply the first prong of the analysis is
especially troubling because the classification of allegations as legal
conclusions can be decisive. With the key allegations excluded in the
first prong, the Iqbal majority, for example, had an easy time concludlegal terminology alone. It makes no sense to penalize a plaintiff for using legal terms
if the allegation is otherwise factually sufficient. Therefore, the defect must have to
do with the factual generality of the allegation.
61 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960-61.
62 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11. Form 11 was made famous by Twombly, which, confusingly for some, approved the Form at the same time as endorsing the plausibility
standard. Before the recent restyling amendments, Form 11 was Form 9 and included
an actual date ("June 1, 1936"), an actual place ("in a public highway called Boylston
Street in Boston, Massachusetts"), and an additional phrase at the end describing
what the plaintiff was doing at the time ("who was then crossing said highway"). FED.
R. Civ. P. Form 9 (2006) (repealed 2007).
63 See FED. R. Civ. P. 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules
64 Justice Souter's treatment of the allegations in Iqbal provides another example.
He argues that the key allegations are just as specific as other allegations the majority
treats as factual. See Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter,J., dissenting). In particular, the
allegation that "'[t]he policy of holding post-September-i1th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were "cleared" by the FBI was
approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after
September 11, 2001'" is, according to Souter, just as general as the key allegations that
the majority condemns. Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint, supra note 38, § 69).
Therefore, if this allegation is factual, as the majority assumes, the key allegations
must be factual too. See id.
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ing that the complaint failed the plausibility test in the second prong.
Thus, the first prong did all the work.
III.

IQBAL's LEGAL-CONCLUSION/FACTUAL-ALLEGATION DISTINCTION
IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The history of the fact-law distinction in pleading sheds light on
the problems with Iqbats two-pronged approach. The following
account briefly describes the distinction in nineteenth century code
practice, summarizes the legal realist critique of it in the early twentieth century, and recounts its fate when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.
A.

The Codes

The typical nineteenth century procedure code required that the
complaint contain "a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting each cause of action." 65 Over the course of the nineteenth century, judges interpreted this provision to require allegations of
"ultimate facts" and to forbid "conclusions of law." 6 6
The requirement that a complaint focus on the facts was a critical
part of the code reforms. The nineteenth century codes were a reaction to the hypertechnicality and perceived irrationality of the common law forms of action and common law pleading.6 7 A plaintiff
bringing a suit at common law alleged formulaic legal language in
order to fit his case into an established form of action, such as assumpsit, trover, trespass on the case, and so on. To the code reformers, this
practice made no sense; it was part of an antiquated and irrational
common law system rooted in a distant past. 68 A rational legal system
relied on a logical classification of abstract rights and remedies, not
on arbitrary forms of action, and respected the fundamental distinction between law and fact. 6 9 In such a system, the plaintiff alleged
only the material, ultimate facts in her complaint and left it to the
court to apply the law.70
CHARLEs E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 138 (1928).
66 See id. at 150, 153-55. Also, alleging "evidential facts" was forbidden, although
this was considered a much less serious transgression than alleging a conclusion of

65

law. See id. at 152-53.
67 See id. at 150.
68 See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions ofldeal Lawsuit Structurefrom the Field Code to the FederalRules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1989).
69 See, e.g., JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §§ 407-23 (5th ed. 1929).
70 See CLARK, supra note 65, at 2-3. For example, courts during the code period
condemned as legal conclusions an allegation that the plaintiff as assignee was
"holder" of a bond, that the defendant received money from the plaintiff "in trust" for
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The problems with the code approach are well known. It
assumed that statements of fact and conclusions of law could be
sharply distinguished; that "dry, naked, actual facts" could be reported
without using legal concepts or legal language.7 1 When the legal realists criticized the code system in the early twentieth century, they
attacked this assumption. The writings of Walter Wheeler Cook on
the subject are particularly illuminating. 72 According to Cook, the
problem with the code's requirement lay "in the assumption that ...
there is some clear, easily drawn and scientific distinction between socalled . . . 'statements of fact' and 'conclusions of law,' whereas in

truth there is none."7 3 And this problem led to bad decisions and
serious decisional inconsistency.7 4
Cook reasoned that while facts exist objectively, they cannot be
stated without first filtering raw experience through a process of
abstraction and classification.7 5 Moreover, since one always abstracts
and classifies for a purpose, any statement of facts must employ concepts relevant to the purpose at hand.7 6
It followed for Cook that pleading facts for legal purposes naturally involves using legal concepts and categories.7 7 For example, an
allegation that the defendant "had in his possession" certain items
"belonging to the plaintiff' uses the technical legal concepts of "possession" and "belonging to." 78 Moreover, Cook argued, many allegacertain purposes, and that the plaintiff was "entitled" to possession of certain property. See id. at 153-55 (giving these and numerous other examples).
71 POMEROY, supra note 69, § 423, at 640 ("[T]he allegations must be of dry,
naked, actual facts, while the rules of law applicable thereto, and the legal rights and
duties arising therefrom, must be left entirely to the courts.").
72 See Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Facts'and 'Statements of Fact, '4 U. Cin. L. REV. 233,
239 (1936) [hereinafter Cook, 'Facts']; Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 416, 417 (1921) [hereinafter Cook, Statements]; see also CLARK, supra note 65, at 155 ("But facts do not easily disentangle themselves from conclusions or from details.").
73 Cook, Statements, supra note 72, at 417.
74 See CLIARK, supra note 65, at 153-55 (describing inconsistent results); see also 5
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1218, at 265 (noting the "evanescent judicial distinctions" and "ultimate calcification," as well as "traps for the unwary" and "tactical
advantages" unrelated to the merits, that the code pleading rules created).
75 See Cook, 'Facts,' supra note 72, at 238-39 (noting that the process involves
"select[ing] from among these infinitely varied aspects those which for some reason
or other we are going to talk about" and then interpreting "the selected 'data' . . . so
as to bring them under some category"); see also CIAR, supra note 65, at 155 (discussing the problem of disentangling facts and evidence).
76 See Cook, 'Facts,' supra note 72, at 239.
77 See id. at 241-43.
78 Id. at 243.
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tions condemned as conclusions of law are just as readily seen as
general statements of fact. He illustrated with an allegation that the
"defendant owes plaintiff $500," which was usually treated as an
impermissible conclusion of law under the codes. 79 Cook pointed out
that this allegation could be regarded "as a statement in generic form
that all the facts necessary to create the legal duty to pay money
described by the word 'owe' are true as between [the defendant and
the plaintiff]."so Roughly speaking, factual allegations included legal
content, and legal conclusions conveyed factual information.
Cook concluded from this analysis that there was no logical difference between permissible factual allegations and impermissible
legal conclusions.8 ' The only relevant distinction was the degree of
factual specificity.82 Conclusions of law were simply statements of fact
pitched at too high a level of generality. Thus, the real question
should be one of policy: How much factual particularity should be
required "according to notions of fairness and convenience" considered in light of the goals that a pleading system should serve?83
There are two important lessons to draw from Cook's realist critique. First, the distinction between legal conclusions and factual allegations is necessarily a matter of degree rather than kind, and in
particular depends on the degree of factual specificity. Second, any
rule about what allegations are permissible and what are not must be
justified on the basis of the policies a pleading system is supposed to
serve. Both lessons will play a role in Part IV's critique of Iqbal.
B.

The FederalRules of Civil Procedure

Inspired by the legal realist critique and committed to liberalizing
pleading practice, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
eliminated the code distinction between facts and legal conclusions.
They did this by avoiding any mention of the word "fact" in the text of
79 Cook, Statements, supra note 72, at 419.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 420.
82 See id. at 421; see also Cook, 'Facts,'supranote 72, at 244 (noting that the difference is "merely one of degree").
83 Cook, Statements, supra note 72, at 422. Cook was firmly committed to notice
pleading, so he advocated a pleading rule that required only as much specificity as
was needed to give reasonable notice to the defendant and the court of "the real
nature of the claim or defense." Id. He also strongly favored official forms as guides
to pleading. See id. at 423; see also CLAR, supra note 65, at 156-57 (focusing on the
notice function); Cook, 'Facts,'supranote 72, at 245-46 (discussing the benefits of the
forms).
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the new pleading rule.84 Their pleading rule, Rule 8(a), required
only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."8 5
Indeed, a pure notice pleading system has little need for a distinction between legal conclusions and factual allegations. Charles Clark
recognized this point when propounding the virtues of simplified
notice pleading,8 6 and modern commentators agree.8 7 The question
for notice pleading is whether the complaint, taken as a whole, gives
fair notice of what the dispute is about. And to answer that question,
one should consider everything the complaint says.
For example, a negligence complaint that says nothing more than
"the defendant negligently hit the plaintiff and the plaintiff was
injured as a result" would almost certainly be dismissed in a notice
pleading system since it fails even to identify the events or incident
that the plaintiff complains about. A court might describe a complaint like this as "conclusory" or say it states only "legal conclusions."8 8 As long as the judge faithfully adhered to the goal of giving
notice, however, these labels could add nothing to the analysis. "Conclusory," "legal conclusion" and the like are simply ways to express a
prior determination that the complaint does not convey enough information to give fair notice to the defendant.
84

Charles Clark, the chief architect of the Federal Rules, put it this way:
By omitting any reference to "facts" the Federal Rules have avoided one
of the most controversial points in code pleading. As Professor Moore has
so aptly stated, "The federal courts are not hampered by the morass of decisions as to whether a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence, or law."
This departure from the traditional code-pleading requirement has been liberally applied by the courts and lauded by the legal writers.
CHARLES E. CLARK ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 242-43 (2d ed.
1947) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 553 (1938)); see also Edson R. Sunderland, The New FederalRules, 45 W. VA.
L.Q. 5, 12 (1938) (noting that the FRCP eliminate any mention of facts because

"courts have been trying for five hundred years to find 'facts' and nobody has ever
been able to draw a line between what were and what were not 'facts'").
85 FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a) (2). For the code provision, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
86 See CLARM, supra note 84, at 241-45.
87 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1218; see also 2 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.04(2), at 35 (3d ed. 2009) (stating that conclusory
allegations are permitted by the Federal Rules, but "sufficient factual allegations must
be pleaded along with the conclusions of law to give fair notice to the opposing
party").
88 See, e.g., Carr v. Sharp, 454 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1971); Magellan Int'l Corp. v.
Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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Nevertheless, even during the heyday of notice pleading under
the Federal Rules, courts used the distinction between legal conclusions and factual allegations for some pleading purposes.8 9 The complaint had to relate facts that at least loosely fit the elements of some
legal theory, and the plaintiff was not allowed to fill gaps with conclusory assertions or general allegations that contradicted the rest of
the complaint.90 Today, it is settled law that a judge deciding a
12(b) (6) motion need not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as true.9 1
These rules most likely reflect the influence of a weak screening
policy. Notice pleading was mostly about giving notice, but judges
must have been reluctant-and understandably so-to let a lawsuit go
forward when it was patently obvious the plaintiff had no legal claim
and was desperately trying to fill holes with general statements.9 2 If
the judge had to accept a general statement at face value, such as "the
defendant acted negligently," without any other factual support, there
would be no way to dismiss a lawsuit that obviously should be
dismissed.93
89 See, e.g., 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 1357, at 544 ("This occasional
judicial reliance on some of the nomenclature of the code pleading regime, such as
'facts' and 'conclusions,' reflects the difficulty of phrasing in abstract terms a rule of
construction of pleadings that is relatively simple in actual operation.") (footnotes
omitted).
90 Id. § 1357, at 544-553 ("[M]any federal courts have made it clear that more
detail often is required than the bald statement by the plaintiff that she has a valid
claim of some legally recognizable type against the defendant. . . . [T]he court will
not accept conclusory allegations concerning the legal effect of the events the plaintiff has set out if these allegations do not reasonably follow from the pleader's description of what happened, or if these allegations are contradicted by the description
itself.") (footnotes omitted).
91 Or inferences that do not reasonably follow from or are contradicted by more
detailed descriptions in the complaint. See id.; 2 MOORE, supra note 87, § 12.34(1) (b).
92 Of course, a 12(b) (6) motion is always available to dismiss a suit when there is
no claim as a matter of law that could give the plaintiffs the relief they seek. For
example, a plaintiff might tell a detailed story about how his teacher's awful teaching
methods ruined his life, but the complaint will still be dismissed because there is no
claim for ordinary educational malpractice. See, e.g., Vill. Cmty. Sch. v. Adler, 478
N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (City Civ. Ct. 1984). The situation that concerns us is very different
from this. Our focus is on cases in which there is a recognized legal claim but the
plaintiff has not adequately alleged it.
93 I focus here on the golden age of notice pleading during the 1960s and 1970s.
It is worth mentioning, however, that starting in the early 1980s, federal judges began
to impose stricter requirements in an effort to screen frivolous suits in some types of
cases, and some judges continued to do so despite contrary Supreme Court holdings.
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-15 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-69 (1993). It
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Still, the question remains: What distinguishes a legal conclusion
from a factual allegation, especially when the allegation in question,
like the key allegations in Iqbal, includes substantial factual content?9 4
The answer in Part IV shows why Iqbats two-pronged approach is
incoherent.
IV.

IQBAL CRITIQUED

The following critique of Iqbal focuses on two problematic features of the Court's analysis. First, the two-pronged approach is incoherent. Second, the Court adopts a stricter version of the plausibility
standard than Twombly did, and this reflects a more aggressive
approach to screening at the pleading stage. This aggressive
approach is not appropriate for many cases, and in any event, it is not
something that the Court should be implementing on its own.
A.

The Two-Pronged Approach: One Prong, Not Two

As Twombly made clear, the plausibility standard is meant to
screen meritless suits, not just give fair notice to the defendant.9 5
Screening requires a critical approach to allegations. To be sure, a
judge cannot ignore an allegation solely because she happens to
doubt the truth of what it says. 96 But she also cannot accept every
allegation at face value and still be able to screen lawsuits.9 7
would not be surprising if these judges used the legal-conclusion/factual-allegation
distinction more aggressively during this later period.
94 The legal-conclusion/factual-allegation dichotomy would be relatively easy to
apply in practice if the category "legal conclusion" were limited to allegations that
simply insert "plaintiff' and "defendant" into a legal proposition otherwise stated in
some recognizably canonical form. Examples might include "the defendant acted
negligently" when the claim is for negligence, or "the defendants conspired" when
the claim is for an antitrust conspiracy. If legal conclusions were limited to this type
of statement, however, the dichotomy would do little work as a practical matter. The
key Iqbal allegations, for instance, are not straightforward canonical statements of the
law. They allege knowledge and other states of mind linked to a discriminatory policy
described in some detail elsewhere in the complaint and even refer to more particular
types of involvement by Ashcroft and Mueller. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
95 See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-60 (2007).
96 See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) ("What Rule 12(b) (6) does
not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual
allegations. District courtjudges looking to dismiss claims on such grounds must look
elsewhere for legal support.").
97 In Twombly, for example, the complaint stated that the defendants "'have

entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry into
their . .. markets and have agreed not to compete with one another.'" Twombly, 550

868

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85-3

The challenge, however, is to define those allegations that should
not be accepted at face value. In other words, what is it about an
allegation that makes it a legal conclusion? Walter Wheeler Cook had
the answer almost a century ago.9 8 Contrary to the arguments of some
commentators,9 9 what qualifies an allegation as a "legal conclusion" or
as too "conclusory" is not that it tracks the elements of a legal claim
too closely. 0 0 Rather it is that the allegation states facts at too high a
level of generality. But when are allegations too general in this sense?
As Cook correctly noted, the answer is when greater specificity is
required to serve the policy goals of pleading. 0 1 The goal of providing notice is consistent with very general allegations, as Cook and
Clark both understood. 0 2 However, a screening goal requires greater
specificity. The requisite level of specificity is set by the strictness of
the pleading standard, which in turn reflects a policy decision about
how much screening is optimal at the pleading stage.
This means that allegations are too general-and thus qualify as
"legal conclusions" or are too "conclusory"-when they fail to meet
the pleading standard. But it is the complaint as a whole that must
meet the standard, not each individual allegation taken separately.
The fact that one allegation is extremely general should not matter as
long as other allegations fill in the necessary detail. Moreover, the
complaint is not just a list of individual allegations. The complaint is
supposed to give a coherent account of the relevant events and transactions involved in the dispute. Therefore, it must be interpreted as a
U.S. at 565 (quoting Complaint at 1 51, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d
174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220)). If the Court had to accept all allegations as
true, it would have had no choice but to conclude that a plausible claim of conspiracy
was stated.
98 See generally supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing Cook's realist critique).
99 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 491-494 (2010).
100 Not only does one need a definition of "too closely" to make this formulation
work, but more importantly, there is no sensible reason why the amount of legal content alone should make the difference and therefore no policy to guide determinations of what is "too close."
101 See Cook, Statements, supra note 72, at 422-23 (describing how much factual
particularity should be required "according to notions of fairness and convenience"
considered in light of the goals that a pleading system should serve).
102 See CLARK, supranote 65, at 157 (noting that "generalities of allegation should
not be objectionable in themselves, so long as reasonably fair notice of the pleader's
cause of action is given."); Cook, Statements, supra note 72, at 422-23 (noting that only
as much specificity is needed to give reasonable notice to the defendant and the court
of "the real nature of the claim or defense").
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coherent whole, and the sufficiency of its allegations must be evaluated in a holistic way.
The Twombly Court understood this point clearly. It did not simply dismiss the questionable allegations of agreement as conclusory
and then subject the remaining allegations to the plausibility standard, as the Iqbal Court claims it did. Instead, it interpreted the complaint as a whole, and based on that interpretation, determined that
the questionable allegations were intended to be conclusions and not
to add any new facts to the complaint. 0 3 Justice Souter also understood this fundamental point in his Iqbal dissent. He interpreted the
key allegations in the context of the complaint as a whole before concluding that the plausibility standard was met.104
It follows from the holistic nature of pleading analysis that there
is no conceptual distinction between the two parts of Iqbal's two-pronged approach. The second prong is all there is to a pleading analysis. It makes no sense first to exclude certain allegations as conclusory
on account of their generality and then to subject the remaining allegations to the pleading standard. The reason certain allegations are
conclusory is that the complaint, interpreted with them in it, does not
meet the pleading standard for the legal element the defective allegations are meant to support. For example, if the key allegations in the
Iqbal complaint are conclusory, it is not because of some defect in the
allegations themselves, but because the complaint that includes them,
when interpreted as a whole, tells a story that does not plausibly support Ashcroft and Mueller having a discriminatory purpose.
This insight is important. The two-pronged approach facilitates
overly aggressive screening at the pleading stage. A judge bent on
screening aggressively does not have to work as hard to apply the plausibility standard if she can classify problematic allegations as legal conclusions and eliminate them at the initial stage. It should be more
difficult for the judge to justify her decisions if she cannot get rid of
pesky allegations so easily and instead must explain why the best interpretation of the complaint taken as a whole, with all the allegations
included, does not meet the plausibility test. I do not mean to suggest
that judges always explain their pleading decisions carefully. Still,
framing pleading doctrine as a single prong should encourage lawyers

103 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
104 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Taking
the complaint as a whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller 'fair notice of what the ...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original))).
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to structure their arguments properly and judges to approach the
analysis in the right way. 0 5
B.

The Strictness of the PleadingStandard

There is a deeper and more serious problem with Iqbal. The
majority applies a stricter pleading standard than the Court did in
Twombly, one that reflects an implicit policy judgment that pleadings
should be used to screen suits more aggressively. Eliminating the key
allegations before applying the plausibility standard obscures this
point. But the difference is significant, and it is crucially important.
To state this point more precisely, it is helpful to distinguish
between two screening approaches. One approach, which I shall call
the "thin screening model," assumes that the only appropriate screening function at the pleading stage is to screen truly meritless suits. By
a "truly meritless suit," I mean a lawsuit in which the defendant is
clearly not liable as an objective matter.10 6 This includes cases in which
liability turns on objective facts about the defendant's conduct and
the defendant in fact did not act in the required way. It also includes
cases, such as those seeking to recover for negligence, in which liability depends on a judgment about the quality of the defendant's conduct relative to a standard, such as unreasonableness, and the
defendant's conduct falls so far short of the liability standard that no
jury could properly find him liable.10 7 A pleading rule based on this
model requires greater factual specificity only when specificity is necessary for the judge to be sufficiently confident that the suit is not
meritless.
The other approach, which I shall call the "thick screening
model," enlists pleading more aggressively. It targets not only clearly
meritless suits, but also suits that might merely be described as weak
but that are not meritless (i.e., suits with too low a probability of trial
success). An example is a negligence case in which the defendant's
conduct is within the range that ajury could properly deem unreason105 It is worth emphasizing that the discussion in the text focuses on pleading.
The fact-law dichotomy operates in other legal contexts, such as dividing decisionmaking responsibility between judge and jury and defining the scope of appellate
review. The dichotomy has a core of meaning that is useful in each of these contexts,
and as in pleading, its application to grey areas depends on the distinctive policies at
stake.
106 I develop this definition more fully in Bone, supra note 7, at 916-19. See also
Robert G. Bone, ModelingFrivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 529-33 (1997) (discussing the problem of defining a "frivolous suit" and offering a definition that
depends on the idea of a suit lacking merit as an objective matter).
107 See Bone, supra note 7, at 917.
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able (thus making the suit meritorious not meritless), but just barely
within that range so a liability judgment at trial is highly unlikely (thus
making the suit weak). There are stricter and more lenient versions
of thick screening depending on where the merits threshold is set.
And even a relatively high threshold might be justified on efficiency
grounds, as necessary to assure that scarce litigation resources are
invested in strong enough cases to reap social benefits that exceed the
social costs. 08
Framed in these terms, my point is that Twombly implements a
thin screening model, while Iqbal implements a thick screening
model. The two models differ in theory, support different pleading
standards, and invite different attitudes toward screening. Many commentators lump Iqbal and Twombly together.1 0 9 They treat Iqbal as just
another application of Twombly, one in which the plausibility standard
is applied outside the antitrust field. This is a mistake. Iqbal's screening approach is qualitatively different than Twombly's, and it is important to understand the differences in order to appreciate Twombly's
virtues distinct from Iqbal's vices.
The following discussion describes the two screening models in
more detail and explains why the thick screening model fits Iqbal and
the thin screening model fits Twombly. It relies on inferences from
the way the Court applies the plausibility standard in each case and on
contrasting language in the two opinions.10
1.

Iqbal and the Thick Screening Model

The thick screening model explains Iqbal's insistence on greater
factual specificity for allegations about Ashcroft's and Mueller's states
of mind and fits the language it uses to justify its holding. To see the
first point, consider a pleading system that adopts the thick screening
model and aims to screen weak cases as well as meritless ones. Suppose the system takes a rather aggressive approach to screening and
108 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case be Dismissed? The Economics ofPleading and Summary judgment Standards, 16 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 39, 41 (2008) ("In general, pleading standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated
legal standards and the social costs of litigation.").
109 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 99 (manuscript at 17-18); Adam N. Steinman,
The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24-35),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1442786 (deriving
pleading principles from Twombly and Iqbal treated as mutually consistent decisions).
110 Distinguishing different levels of screening and pleading strictness through
case interpretation is a tricky business. The flexibility and open-ended nature of the
plausibility concept only compounds the problem by making it more difficult to nail
down precisely how the concept is being applied.
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seeks to screen cases that do not have at least a moderate chance of
success at trial (say, somewhere around a thirty to forty percent
chance of success)."' Ajudge would need to know quite a bit about
the facts before she could be confident that a particular case was at
least that strong. As a result, we would expect the pleading standard
to be fairly strict and require rather specific allegations for each
element. 112
More precisely, allegations are too general in this pleading system
when they do not reveal enough about the case to show how the plaintiff might prove liability at trial. For example, suppose the plaintiff
brings a negligence suit and alleges that "on June 1, 2008, the defendant, while driving his car down Beacon Street in Boston, Massachusetts, negligently struck the plaintiff, who was walking across the
street."1 13 This allegation certainly suggests negligence, even without
the adverb "negligently." After all, pedestrians are not usually struck
by cars unless the driver fails to use reasonable care. But the allegation is not specific enough to instill confidence that the case has a
moderate chance of trial success. To be sure, ajudge could be reasonably confident that the plaintiff would be able to prove that she was
struck on Beacon Street by a car, that the car was driven by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was walking across the street at the time.1 1 4
All of these are objectively verifiable facts likely to have been observed
by witnesses-and some by the plaintiff herself-and perhaps even
included in a police report. However, these facts are not enough
alone. There are just too many non-negligent ways that the plaintiff
might have been struck. For example, the defendant's car might have
slid on an oil slick that was not detectable by a reasonably careful
driver, or the plaintiff might have recklessly jaywalked.
111 Of course, the judge is likely to conceive of a merits threshold in rough qualitative terms rather than numerical probabilities. It is worth mentioning that two commentators have argued for a fifty percent probability cutoff. See Warren F. Schwartz &
C. Frederick Beckner III, Toward a Theory of the "MeritoriousCase": Legal Uncertainty as a
Social Choice Problem, 6 GEo. MASON L. REv. 801, 816-19 (1998).
112 By contrast, if the decision is to screen only cases that are virtually certain to
lose, the judge would need less factual detail to make the necessary determination,
and as a result the pleading standard would tolerate allegations at a higher level of
generality.
113 This allegation is based on, but a bit more detailed than, the allegation in
Form 11 appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Crv. P. Form
11. In fact, it is very similar to the original Form 9 version before the restyling amendments. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
114 To be sure, the plaintiff states that the defendant acted "negligently," but negligence is something that must be proved by showing more specific facts.
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Thus, more specific facts are needed before the judge can make
the requisite assessment of trial success. It might be enough, for
example, if the plaintiff also alleged that the defendant's car was
speeding and that the plaintiff was crossing the street on a green light
and in the sidewalk. These additional facts, like the others alleged,
are objectively verifiable and likely to have evidentiary support in an
automobile negligence case. This is not to say, of course, that the
plaintiff will actually be able to prove them. That depends on the
admissible evidence and is not a matter for determination at the
pleading stage. The assessment of likely trial success that the thick
screening model requires is an all-things-considered prediction based
on what the complaint tells the judge about the facts and what the
judge knows from her experience about how facts like the ones
alleged are usually proved in similar cases.' 1 5
All the previous examples involve facts that are, in theory at least,
objectively verifiable and in a relatively straightforward way. However,
facts that are difficult to verify objectively fare much worse in a thick
screening model. Two notable examples are the types of factual allegations at issue in Iqbal and Twombly: descriptions of the defendant's
state of mind (e.g., Iqbal's allegations of knowledge, condoning, willfulness and malice relevant to discriminatory intent), and references
to actions taken in private (e.g., Twombly's allegation of an agreement). This type of information is often within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant and the plaintiff will usually have considerable
difficulty learning much about it before filing. As a result, general
allegations merely reciting the existence of a state of mind or a private
action are not likely to instill much confidence that the plaintiff will
be able to prove those allegations at trial. So it makes sense for a
judge in our hypothetical, seeking to determine whether the suit has a
moderate chance of trial success, to demand that the plaintiff show
more support in the complaint. And the plaintiff does this by alleging
supporting facts that are more specific and more easily verified
objectively.
Thus, the reason why ajudge applying a thick screening model' 16
would find the allegations in Iqbal and Twombly insufficient and clas115 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009) ("[D]etermining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to
draw on its experience and common sense.").
116 This is not the reason the Twombly Court actually gave for treating the general
allegations of agreement as conclusory. Rather the Court reasoned that the best
interpretation of the complaint as a whole showed that these allegations were meant
to be conclusions. See supranotes 52-53 and accompanying text. That is not surprising because the Twombly Court did not apply a thick screening model. See infra Part
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sify them as conclusory is because the facts they allege are very likely
to be the private information of the defendant, so the judge cannot be
confident enough of trial success without more supporting detail.1 17
To crystallize this point, it is useful to contrast an ordinary breach of
contract suit between two contracting firms in which the plaintiff
alleges that "the parties entered into an agreement by which the plaintiff promised to sell and the defendant to buy widgets." This allegation is as general as the one in Twombly, but there is an important
difference. The plaintiff was a party to the agreement and this gives
her direct access to specific factual support. Indeed, the plaintiffs
employees are likely to have direct knowledge of the transaction and
can testify to it at trial. Thus, the judge has reason to be more confident here than in Twombly that the plaintiff will be able to prove the
existence of an agreement, and as a result the judge should be much
less inclined to demand greater factual specificity.11 8
This interpretation of Iqbal explains why the Court demands
greater specificity for the mental-state allegations in the complaint." 9
IV.B.2., where I consider how allegations like these would be treated in a thin screening model.
117 Requiring more detail for facts that are private information of the defendant
puts the plaintiff in a kind of Catch-22. She must allege more detail before discovery,
but the detail she must allege is very difficult to obtain without discovery. This feature
of the problem means that the thick screening model risks high social costs by screening strong meritorious suits as well as weak ones. See infra Part IV.C.
118 The judge might still demand more facts, however, if the merits threshold were
set very high.
119 It is significant, I believe, that many cases decided after Iqbal classify allegations
as conclusory when they involve state of mind or other private information that is
likely to be proved circumstantially and the plaintiff does not allege enough of the
circumstantial facts. See Cafaro v. HMC Int'l, LLC, No. 07-2793, 2009 WL 1622825, at
*3-5 (D.N.J. June 10, 2009) (finding that statements alleging defendant "knowingly
and substantially assisted" another party's wrongdoing and was "actually ... aware" of
the wrongdoing were conclusory); Halderman v. City of Iberia, No. 094049-CV, 2009
WL 1912531, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 1, 2009) (finding allegation of conspiracy conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations); Mohammad v. N.Y. State Higher
Educ. Servs. Corp., No. 08-CV-4943, 2009 WL 1514635, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009)
(finding statements that collection actions reinitiated after twenty years were resumed
due to plaintiffs race conclusory and unsupported by accompanying factual allegations). But see Tyree v. Zenk, No. 05-CV-2998, 2009 WL 1456554, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May
22, 2009) (applying Iqbal to conclude that circumstantial evidence of defendants
being in cahoots meets plausibility requirement with factual allegations). Admittedly,
and as Justice Souter recognizes, the Iqbal majority accepts some general allegations
that seem rather similar to the state-of-mind allegations it rejects. In particular, the
Court accepts as true the allegation that "'[tihe policy of holding post-September11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were
"cleared" by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in dis-
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Moreover, it provides a rigorous framework for understanding what
seems obvious when reading the opinion, that the Court is more
demanding than it was in Twombly. And it also accounts for particular
language in the opinion. For example, Iqbal frames the plausibility
inquiry as inferring liability from facts in a way that evokes the jury's
function at trial: "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonableinference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."o20 The
Court cites Twombly to support this formulation, 12 ' but Twombly never
stated the standard in such strong terms. Instead, Twombly used softer
language, employing the word "suggest" throughout the opinion: The
allegations must "suggest that an agreement was made."' 2 2
To be sure, 1qbal mentions that "the plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,"' but it does so only in passing as
part of a boilerplate summary of the doctrine.123 By contrast, Twombly
emphasizes repeatedly that it does not require a likelihood of trial
success and that a lawsuit can go forward even if the judge believes
that the facts alleged are "improbable."1 2 4 AndJustice Souter makes a
cussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (alteration
in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint, supranote 38, 1 69). This allegation
refers to private information of the defendants, so one might have expected the Court
to demand more factual support if I am correct about its applying a thick screening
model. However, three points are critical. First, the allegation is difficult to label as a
"legal conclusion" because what it says is not closely enough connected to a legal
element (although it might still be characterized as too "conclusory"). While all legal
conclusions are general factual allegations, not all general factual allegations can be
classified as legal conclusions. Second, unlike the allegation of agreement in Twombly,
this allegation rings true on its face. It would have been reasonable for Ashcroft and
Mueller to approve a policy of restrictive confinement given the 9/11 events. Third, it
is easier to imagine how this allegation would be proved than it is to imagine how the
mental-state allegations in the Iqbal complaint would be proved.
120 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (emphasis added).
121 Id.
122 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). I count no fewer than seven
places in the opinion where the Court uses the word "suggest" or a variation to state
the plausibility standard. See id. at 556 ("suggest"), 557 ("suggestion," "plausibly suggesting," and "suggesting"), 562 ("suggests"), 566 ("plausible suggestion"), 569 ("suggested"). The Court also notes that the standard, rather than imposing a probability
of success requirement, "simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." Id. at 556. This passage does
refer to a reasonable expectation, but the expectation is about discovery, not liability.
And the fact that the Court juxtaposes it to the probability of trial success sharpens
the contrast.
123 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
124 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (noting that "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and
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point of recalling this portion of the Twombly opinion when criticizing
the majority in his Iqbal dissent. 125
2.

Twombly and the Thin Screening Model

In my previous article, I argued that the best reading of Twombly
is that the Court means to screen only suits that are truly meritless.126
In keeping with this goal, the plausibility standard functions as an
epistemological rather than a merits threshold.' 2 7 In other words,
plausibility refers not to the likelihood of success at trial, but rather to
a threshold level of confidence a judge must have that the lawsuit is
not meritless. Thus, a judge should not dismiss if she is convinced
that it is at least plausible that the suit is meritorious even if she also
believes that it will very likely lose at trial.
I also argued that Twombly set a relatively low confidence threshold. A complaint is sufficient if the story it tells differs significantly
from what is treated as the normal baseline state of affairs associated
with lawful conduct, and in a way that suggests illegality. 128 The
Twombly complaint failed to meet this standard because the parallel
conduct it described was exactly what one would expect from a vigorously competitive telecommunications market. In other words, the
story the complaint told was just the normal baseline of competitive
activity in that market. 129
To be sure, the conduct alleged might possibly have been the
result of illegal agreement; after all, what seems perfectly ordinary
sometimes involves illegality. But plaintiffs have to allege some facts
that at least "suggest" as much.13 0 Otherwise, there would be no way
to screen meritless suits at the pleading stage. Virtually anyone could
sue by alleging perfectly ordinary conduct and arguing that there is
always a possibility of wrongdoing even under ordinary circumstances.
Thus, Twombly uses a thin screening model with a low confidence
threshold. Had the Iqbal Court used the same model, it would have
had much more difficulty holding as it did. With the key allegations
included, the best interpretation of the Iqbal complaint is that it tells a
highly unusual story-the story of 9/11 and its aftermath-that differs
'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'"
232, 236 (1974))).
125 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J.,
126 Bone, supra note 7, at 918-19.
127 See id. at 918.
128 See id. at 885-88.
129 See id. at 884-85.
130 See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
complaint does not set forth a single fact in a

(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
dissenting).

544, 555 (2007); id. at 561-62 ("[T]he
context that suggests an agreement.").
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sharply from what is normal for officials conducting investigations and
detaining suspects; in other words, from the ordinary baseline for
investigation and detention activities.1 3 1 Moreover, interpreted
against the background circumstances-just as the Twombly Court
interpreted the allegations of parallel conduct in that case 132-the
story the complaint tells differs from the baseline in ways that at least
"suggest" knowledge, condoning, and perhaps even more direct
involvement on the part of Ashcroft and Mueller in discriminatory
conduct by lower level officials. As the Iqbal court of appeals correctly
observed, "the likelihood that [Ashcroft and Mueller] would have concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation of policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested on federal charges
in the New York City area and designated 'of high interest' in the
aftermath of 9/11"133 makes it plausible that they would have "condoned and agreed to the discrimination."1 3 4
Put simply, the Iqbal complaint tells a story that is unusual
enough to suggest something fishy might be going on. To use the
language of Twombly, the allegations are "enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level."13 5 Of course, the plaintiff might
have great difficulty proving discriminatory intent at trial-mental
states are notoriously hard to prove-and his complaint offers little
reassurance that he will be able to do so. This, I believe, is the reason
the Iqbal majority found the complaint insufficient. But Twombly did
not demand any particular likelihood of trial success, just a narrative
that significantly differs from the ordinary state of affairs.1 36 Trial suc131 Within the ordinary baseline of investigation and detention activities, it is reasonable to assume that government officials almost always behave responsibly and
lawfully.
132 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564-69 (taking account of publicly available background information about the history and structure of the telecommunications
market).
133 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
134 Id. at 175; see also id. at 166 ("Even as to Ashcroft and Mueller, it is plausible to
believe that senior officials of the Department of Justice would be aware of policies
concerning the detention of those arrested ... in the aftermath of 9/11 and would
know about, condone, or otherwise have personal involvement in the implementation
of those policies."). For endorsement of the court of appeals' analysis on similar
grounds, see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General Rules," 2009
Wis. L. REv. 535, 556-57.
135 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
136 See id. at 557 n.5 (stating that the plausibly standard marks a line "between the
factually neutral and the factually suggestive"); see also Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter.J., dissenting) (stating that in Iqbal, by contrast to Twombly, "the allegations in the
complaint are neither confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent with legal
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cess is for the thick screening model, which is what the Iqbal Court
uses.' 3 7 Twombly, however, applies a thin screening model.
C. Problems With Thick Screening and Strict Standards
A thick screening model with a strict pleading standard is highly
problematic. 3 s Strict pleading can produce screening benefits for
some cases, but it does so in a relatively crude way and at an uncertain
and potentially high cost. The most serious cost involves screening
meritorious suits. In cases like Iqbal, where the defendant has critical
conduct" and concluding that the Iqbal "complaint therefore contains 'enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570)). It is also significant that Twombly makes a point of noting that allegations of
parallel conduct might be sufficient when the background circumstances make the
conduct harder to explain in competitive terms. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.4. In
Iqbal the allegations hardly describe proper law enforcement behavior and as the
court of appeals in Iqbal v. Hasty recognized, the background circumstances are not
neutral with respect to Ashcroft's and Mueller's involvement. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at
165-66.
137 Two additional points deserve special mention. First, although I believe the
best interpretation is to associate 1qbal with a thick screening model, it is also possible
that the Court applies a thin screening model with a high confidence threshold. This
interpretation would be consistent with a focus on the likelihood of trial success if
trial success were used as a measure of confidence-as in the stronger the case
appears, the greater the confidence that it is not meritless. Nothing much turns on
this distinction, however, because a thin screening model with a high confidence
threshold, although different in theory, operates like a thick screening model in practice. Moreover, on either interpretation of Iqbal, the core difference is the same. In
Iqbal, the Court dismissed based on the weakness of the case, while in Twombly, the
Court dismissed based on the facial implausibility of the complaint.
Second, the Iqbal Court's discussion of the substantive standard for supervisory
liability confuses matters a bit. The Court holds that Ashcroft and Mueller are not
liable unless they themselves had a discriminatory purpose. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Plaintiffs will usually prove discriminatory purpose circumstantially, of course,
but the Court does not offer much insight into what constitutes an adequate circumstantial case against Ashcroft and Mueller. This can affect evaluation of the complaint
at the pleading stage. The stronger the circumstantial case that is required, the more
might be demanded from a complaint. However, the Court mentions that evidence
showing that the defendants "condoned" the discriminatory practices of their subordinates might be enough to support an inference of discriminatory intent. See id. at
1952. Furthermore, as the court of appeals observed in Iqbal v. Hasty, the complaint's
allegations coupled with the background circumstances suggests at least that much.
See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 175. In any event, a thin screening model with a low confidence
threshold is not consistent with fine parsing of the complaint. That is the sort of
thing one would expect from a court implementing a thick screening model.
138 I discuss these problems in my previous work. See Bone, supra note 7, at
926-28, 932-33. I summarize the highlights in the text and apply the analysis to the
Iqbal case.
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private information, the plaintiff will not get past the pleading stage if
she cannot ferret out enough facts before filing to get over the merits
threshold for each element of her claim. As a result, strict pleading
will screen some meritorious suits, even ones with a high probability
of trial success but a probability that is not evident at the pleading
stage before access to discovery.
These problems are likely to be especially serious for civil rights
cases, and particularly cases like Iqbal involving state-of-mind elements.13 9 Because of the difficulty in obtaining specific information
about mental states, many cases that would have a good chance of
winning with evidence uncovered in discovery will be dismissed under
a thick screening model that demands specific factual allegations at
the pleading stage. Moreover, screening deserving civil rights cases is
particularly troubling from a social point of view. If constitutional
rights protect important moral interests, then the harm from failing
to vindicate a valid constitutional claim must be measured in moral
terms too.14 0 This means that the cost side of the policy balance
includes moral harms, and moral harms must be accorded great
weight. 14 1
139 We actually know very little about the effects of Iqbal and Twombly on dismissal
rates in civil rights and other types of litigation. One empirical study based on published opinions found an increase in dismissal rates after Twombly, and again after
Iqbal,with the strongest impact observed in constitutional civil rights suits. Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:Do Twombly and Iqbal MatterEmpirically?, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 553, 556 (2010). By contrast, a preliminary study of district court docket entries
conducted by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts revealed little
effect on dismissal rates. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MOTIONS To Dismiss:
INFORMATION ON COLLECTION OF DATA, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Motions%20to%2ODismiss.pdf. These two studies provide useful information, but
they also suffer from methodological limitations that are likely to skew their results.
The Federal Judicial Center is currently conducting a more systematic and reliable
empirical study, and we should know more about the effects of Twombly and Iqbal
after that study is completed.
140 Cf Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1980) (noting that Section 1983
"reflects a congressional judgment that a 'damages remedy against the offending
party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional
guarantees'" and that the statute was "enacted to aid in the 'preservation of human
liberty and human rights'" (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636,
651 (1980))).
141 This is a rough way to summarize the analysis. More precisely, a strict pleading
system should be evaluated for its impact on error costs and process costs. See Bone,
supra note 7, at 910-15 (providing a more complete and rigorous account of the
policy analysis). Error costs include the cost of false positives (undesirable suits that
get past the pleading stage) and the cost of false negatives (desirable suits that are
screened at the pleading stage by a strict pleading rule). Process costs include the
cost of administering the rule, including the cost of litigating and deciding motions to
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Perhaps a stricter standard is justified in Iqbal because the defendants assert qualified immunity. Qualified immunity aims to protect
government officials from litigation burdens and distractions that can
interfere with effective government service. 142 As long an official does
not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which he
should reasonably have been aware, he cannot be held liable for damages even if the court ultimately finds a constitutional violation.14 3
The good government policies supporting qualified immunity make
the expected benefits of case screening substantially greater than in
ordinary cases, and one could argue that these benefits justify the
high moral costs of screening civil rights suits, at least in some cases.
Moreover, because it focuses on shielding officials from unjustified
litigation burdens, qualified immunity is conceived as immunity from
suit, not just from liability.144 This arguably makes early screening
especially important.
With social costs and social benefits substantial in qualified immunity cases, the best one can say, without more empirical information,
dismiss. To simplify the analysis, let us put process costs aside and focus exclusively on
error costs. Two factors influence the magnitude of expected error costs: the
probability of error and the cost of error. The social benefit of strict pleading is that
it reduces the probability of false positive error. The magnitude of that benefit
depends on how much the probability is reduced and the cost of the false positive
errors avoided. Similarly, the social cost of strict pleading is that it increases the
probability of false negative error by screening desirable suits. The magnitude of that
cost depends on how much the probability is increased and the cost of the new false
negative errors created. Using this framework, the point made in the text can be
stated in the following way. A thick screening model is particularly problematic for
civil rights suits like Iqbal because the expected cost of a strict pleading rule is likely to
be very high in these cases. And it is likely to be high because the probability of a false
negative is high (due to the difficulty of alleging state-of-mind elements with specificity) and the cost of a false negative is high (because that cost involves a failure to
vindicate morally valuable constitutional rights). A reader might object to my characterizing the analysis as a cost-benefit balance when moral harms are involved. But
doing so is useful heuristically, as long as one bears in mind that serious moral harms
are not easily outweighed by ordinary cost savings on the benefit side. See id. at
912-14 (explaining "rights-based balancing").
142 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. More specifically, the doctrine recognizes that
officials who are distracted by the burdens of litigation have less time to devote to
government service, and that officials who are concerned about the burden of future
litigation and the risk of personal liability might shy away from perfectly lawful action
for fear that it might precipitate unfounded litigation. See id.
143 See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816 (2009) ("Qualified immunity is
applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional
right of which a reasonable person would have known.").
144 See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985).
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is that the policy case for strict pleading in suits like Iqbal is uncertain.
But the Iqbal Court does not confine its holding to qualified immunity
cases. It presents its two-pronged approach as the proper analysis for
all cases subject to Rule 8(a), even those where the benefits of early
screening are much weaker. 145
Moreover, even in Iqbal, strict pleading might not have been the
best way to achieve an optimal policy balance. The lower courts
offered a promising alternative: thin screening followed by limited
access to discovery before subjecting the case to a more aggressive
screening approach. 1 4 6 This plan allows a plaintiff to get past the
pleading stage and gain access to limited discovery on the strength of
a complaint that shows more than a mere possibility of discriminatory
intent (although not a strong likelihood of trial success). At the same
time, the defendants do not have to face broad discovery and can use
summary judgment to exit the litigation if the early returns fail to provide additional support for the claim.
The Iqbal majority rejects this plan and forces the plaintiff to
meet a strict pleading standard before discovery. 147 It relies on
Twombly's skepticism about the ability of trial judges to check discovery abuse through case management.1 4 8 To be sure, there are serious
problems relying on case management to control costs and discourage
frivolous suits, especially for complex antitrust class actions like
Twombly.14 9 Those problems might also be serious in Iqbal given the
magnitude and extent of post-9/11 events, but the qualified immunity
and supervisory liability issues are reasonably well-defined and the
lower courts' limited and staged discovery plan seems sensible.1 50
145 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. The Court insists that its analysis is just what
Twombly requires, and as the Court also tells us, Twombly's analysis applies to all cases
subject to Rule 8. Id. at 1953.
146 See supra notes 27, 33, and accompanying text. This is similar to the proposal I
develop in my Twombly article, which recommends limited access to before-screening
discovery. See Bone, supra note 7, at 932-35.
147 In fact, while the appeals were pending, the plaintiff in Iqbal had access to
discovery against other defendants, which might have revealed information helpful in
fleshing out the allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller. This strategy, however,
depends on the plaintiff suing multiple defendants and the claims against some of the
defendants surviving dismissal. Many lawsuits do not fit this profile.
148 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007)).
149 See Bone, supra note 7, at 898-900; Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A CriticalLook
at ProceduralDiscretion, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 1961, 2016-23 (2007).
150 However, the judge must be willing to grant summary judgment based on the
results of substantially truncated discovery and resist the temptation to allow plaintiffs
more discovery in the hope that something might eventually be uncovered.
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Given this, defendants should at least have the burden to explain why
the plan is not likely to work.1 5'
Perhaps the Court adopted a strict pleading approach because of
the special circumstances of the case. Ashcroft and Mueller were
high-level government officials and arguably needed maximum flexibility to formulate swift and effective responses to unexpected dangers
like 9/11. It would be a serious problem if the costs and risks of litigation chilled officials at this level from acting decisively. Moreover, the
case deals with the chaotic aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and
there might be some reason to hesitate before unleashing broad discovery in this type of situation. Of course, one can also argue that
officials have strong incentives to ignore legal constraints in emergency situations and therefore legal accountability is especially important in these circumstances. Nevertheless, insofar as these factors
played a major role in the Court's decision, they favor a narrow interpretation of Iqbal that reserves its strict approach to similar
situations.1 52
The lesson to draw from the previous analysis is that the case for
strict pleading based on a thick screening model is highly problematic. There might be certain types of cases in which it is justified,
including perhaps some cases involving qualified immunity, but even
in those cases, limited discovery should be allowed beforehand.
By contrast, there is much to commend a thin screening model,
at least one, like the Twombly Court's version, that employs a low confidence threshold. This approach screens only those cases where the
complaint fails to tell an unusual enough story relative to the baseline
of normality to suggest wrongdoing. Without demanding at least this
much from a complaint, cases can proceed even though there is no
particular reason to believe that the defendant did anything wrong,
and the threat of high discovery costs can pressure even innocent
defendants to settle. Moreover, allowing cases to proceed under these
conditions empowers private plaintiffs to use civil adjudication primarily as an instrument of investigation. To be sure, investigation
151 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152 It is worth mentioning that, if these concerns get weight, there is a countervailing concern that perhaps should get some weight as well. The Iqbal case provides
an opportunity for the public to learn about serious abuses in the wake of 9/11 and to
hold government officials accountable. It is possible that transparency and accountability can be achieved in other ways, such as through a government investigation, but
if the alternatives are limited, then civil adjudication could be the most promising
means to accomplish the result. Of course, one would still demand a viable case, but
the additional value of the case as an instrument to investigate and hold officials
accountable might justify a more lenient approach at the pleading stage.
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through discovery can reveal useful information, but investigation is
not in itself the purpose of adjudication. That purpose is to furnish
remedies for substantive law violations. Given this, it might be reasonable to demand that the complaint at least suggest legal wrongdoing
before a plaintiff can use discovery to investigate extensively.
Furthermore, I have argued elsewhere that a thin approach like
the one the Twombly Court uses might even be required by a general
principle of fairness as reason-giving.15 3 This principle imposes a duty
on government to give reasons before imposing significant burdens
on individuals. Here the government imposes burdens by forcing
defendants to answer a complaint and litigate at the risk of suffering a
default judgment, and it fulfills its duty to give reasons by requiring
that the plaintiffs complaint suggest legal wrongdoing. To be sure, a
thin screening model will screen some meritorious suits, especially
under conditions of asymmetric information. But with a low confidence threshold, the risk is likely to be much less than in a thick
screening model.1 5 4
D.

Some Thoughts on How to Proceed From Here

This analysis is complex and its complexity supports one firm
conclusion. The Supreme Court is not the optimal institution to
design a strict pleading rule, especially one that implements a thick
screening model.15 5 The cost-benefit balance depends on empirical
information about the frequency of meritless litigation, the difficulty
of access to pre-filing information, the impact of litigation costs on
government actors, and other factors. The Court is not in a good
153 See Bone, supra note 7, at 900-09.
154 Depending on the nature of the fairness objection, one might be able to
reduce the risk of screening meritorious suits even further by giving the plaintiff
access to very limited prescreening discovery for some types of cases, such as those
where information-access obstacles are extremely high-at least as long as the discovery is not so burdensome as to trigger serious fairness concerns.
155 See Bone, supra note 7, 930-36; see also Burbank, supra note 134, at 559 ("The
Twombly Court .. . was not well positioned institutionally to evaluate even the procedural costs and benefits of tightening the pleading screws on plaintiffs, even in the isolated substantive-law context involved in the case."). Ironically, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly made this point itself, holding that federal courts have no common law
power to make heightened pleading rules on their own and that this must be done
through the formal rulemaking process or by Congress. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). If I am correct that the Iqbal Court applies a thick
screening model, then the Court ignores these earlier holdings without admitting
that it is doing so.
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position to gather and process this information. Nor is the Court wellsuited institutionally to compare strict pleading to other methods for
discouraging frivolous filings, such as penalties and fee shifting.
These concerns counsel in favor of giving the task of rule design
to the formal rulemaking process1 5 6 or perhaps to Congress. The two
bills currently pending in Congress, however, are far from optimal.1 5 7
Both bills are knee-jerk and rather crude responses to Twombly and
Iqbal. Both would reinstate liberal notice pleading without taking
account of the legitimate screening concerns addressed by Twombly
and the strong policies favoring a thin screening model with a low
confidence threshold. Moreover, both bills ignore the serious possibility that thick screening might be desirable in some cases as long as
the merits threshold is not set too high and limited discovery is
allowed before screening takes place.
I prefer the formal rulemaking process to Congress, and fortunately each of the two pending bills contains language that allows
amendments adopted through that process to supersede the bill's provisions. 15 8 Formal rulemaking has a number of important advantages
as a way to address pleading issues.' 59 The rulemaking committees
are more insulated from political pressure and more strongly concerned with the integrity of the procedural system as a whole, and
their membership has experience with and expertise in federal civil
procedure. In particular, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules can
collect and process information, assess global effects, and compare
different screening options. Moreover, the Committee invites public
participation by holding hearings and soliciting written input. This is
especially important for proposals that restrict court access in civil
rights cases given the political controversy those proposals are likely to
156 The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2073 (2006), vests the authority to
make procedural rules in the United States Supreme Court and creates a multistage
rulemaking process with opportunities for public input. A proposed amendment is
first considered by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and then works its way up
the rulemaking pyramid.
157 For these two bills, see supra n~otes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
158 See H.R. 4115, 111th Cong., § 2 (2009) ("The provisions ... govern according
to their terms except as otherwise expressly provided . .. by amendments made after
the date of enactment of this section to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... ); S.
1504, 111th Cong., § 2 (prefacing the bill text with: "Except as otherwise provided ...
by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the
date of enactment of this Act").
159 For an account of the relative advantages of the formal rulemaking process, see
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and ProceduralEfficacy, 87 GEO. L. J. 887, 920-26 (1999).
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generate. Perhaps then Iqbal's most serious mistake is to take on a
task better left to other institutions.
CONCLUSION

Iqbal changes the pleading landscape. It adopts a two-pronged
approach with a first prong that makes little sense. It purports to
apply Twombly's plausibility standard in a routine manner, but actually
adopts a stricter approach. It rejects sensible lower court efforts to
balance competing policies and protect constitutional rights, but
offers no convincing justification for the rejection. It relies on qualified immunity and extraordinary events, but does not limit its holding
to cases with those features. In short, Iqbal is a major decision with an
ill-advised holding and a poorly reasoned opinion.
But the problems run deeper. Iqbal illustrates the consequences
of leaving strict pleading to the Supreme Court to develop case-bycase. The Court is simply not the right institution to be making these
decisions. Fortunately, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the
Standing Committee are currently giving serious attention to Twombly
and Iqbal These committees are taking a careful and measured
approach, collecting empirical information and studying the issues
before entertaining reform proposals. We can only hope that the
result will be a sensible set of pleading rules based on strong empirics
and a rigorous policy analysis and striking a sound balance among the
competing values at stake in regulating court access.
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